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Abstract—With the advent of revolutionary technologies, such
as virtualization and softwarization, a novel concept for 5G
networks and beyond has been unveiled: Network Slicing. Initially
driven by the research community, standardization bodies as
3GPP have embraced it as a promising solution to revolutionize
the traditional mobile telecommunication market by enabling
new business models opportunities. Network Slicing is envisioned
to open up the telecom market to new players such as Industry
Verticals, e.g. automotive, smart factories, e-health, etc. Given
the large number of potential new business players, dubbed as
network tenants, novel solutions are required to accommodate
their needs in a cost-efficient and secure manner.
In this paper, we propose NSBchain, a novel network slicing
brokering (NSB) solution, which leverages on the widely adopted
Blockchain technology to address the new business models needs
beyond traditional network sharing agreements. NSBchain de-
fines a new entity, the Intermediate Broker (IB), which enables
Infrastructure Providers (InPs) to allocate network resources to
IBs through smart contracts and IBs to assign and re-distribute
their resources among tenants in a secure, automated and scalable
manner. We conducted an extensive performance evaluation
by means of an open-source blockchain platform that proves
the feasibility of our proposed framework considering a large
number of tenants and two different consensus algorithms.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Network Slicing, 5G-and-beyond
I. INTRODUCTION
With the announced arrival of the 5th generation of mobile
networks (5G), vertical industries can embrace the mobile
ecosystem and explore novel sources of revenues. Overcoming
the traditional telecom stagnation on connectivity services,
network slicing expands telecom services towards dedicated
virtual network instances, or slices, customized to meet spe-
cific industry verticals service requirements. The advantage
coming from the adoption of the network slicing paradigm
is two-fold: i) Infrastructure Providers (InPs) will be able
to reach greater levels of resource sharing, thus increasing
the actual utilization of their physical infrastructure by means
of statistical multiplexing of requests coming from 3-rd party
vertical industries [1]; ii) vertical industries will benefit from
dedicated mobile network slices enabling advanced services to
their final users, with specific Quality of Service (QoS) and
Service Level Agreements (SLAs).
The novel network slicing paradigm, made available by the
latest developments on virtualization and softwarization tech-
nologies, enables advanced and dynamic resource allocation
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schemes built on top of modular mobile architectures and
commoditized platforms. Such advanced resource allocation
mechanisms must deal with a heterogeneous and wide set of
vertical requirements to satisfy per-slice performance guaran-
tees. In this context, the figure of the Network Slicing Broker
(NSB), firstly introduced in [2], acts as an entity in charge of
mediating between industry verticals’ slice requests and the
mobile infrastructure resource orchestrator.
In this paper, we extend the NSB concept towards further
dividing the value chain and allowing the entrance of new
players in a similar manner as mobile virtual network operators
(MVNOs) did in telecom networks. MVNOs allowed InPs to
address specific market niches, which they did not manage
to tap into due to the subscriber acquisition costs. The
new challenge here is that, while the number of MVNOs is
rather small in established mobile markets, network slicing
is expected to accommodate hundreds to thousands of new
industry vertical tenants, ranging from full coverage connected
car platforms to localized IoT deployments.
In order to achieve this, we introduce the figure of the
Intermediate Broker (IB), which leverages on Blockchain tech-
nology to develop the network slicing brokering (NSB) solution
NSBchain, enabling Infrastructure Providers (InPs) to allocate
network resources to IBs through smart contracts and IBs to
allocate and re-distribute their resources among tenants in a
secure, automated and scalable manner. While MVNO agree-
ments with InPs have to go through a regular offline contract
signature process, NSBchain enables a much faster, scalable
and cost-efficient secure online digital signature process for
the resource allocation transactions.
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows:
• Introduction of a novel hierarchical network slicing bro-
kering framework based on blockchain to support the
evolution of the telecom business model.
• Design of a Blockchain-based smart contracts and con-
sensus system that allows, in sliced networks, dynamic
resource exchange among tenants.
• Evaluation of our NSBchain framework building on top
of the HyperLedger platform [3] and analysis of key
performance features, e.g. transaction throughput, com-
munication latency and platform scalability.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section II
provides an overview of the network slicing concept and
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summarizes the related work in the field. Section III in-
troduces the conceptual architecture and means to support
network slicing in 5G systems, proposing the figure of the
Intermediate Broker and discussing the applicability of the
blockchain technology in the network slice resource brokering
scenario. Section IV proposes the novel NSBchain framework
to support the interaction between stakeholders as well as
automatize the transfer of resource ownership in a secure way,
whereas Section V validates the overall platform presenting a
Proof-of-Concept implementation and its performance. Finally,
Section VI concludes the paper.
II. THE NETWORK SLICING BROKERAGE PROCESS
The network slicing business model revolves around three
main entities [2]: i) the Infrastructure Provider (InP), which
is the owner of the mobile network physical infrastructure and
responsible for its maintenance, ii) the Network Slice Tenants,
which are those business entities, e.g., Over-The-Top (OTT)
service providers or 3rd-party vertical industries, interested
in renting a slice of the mobile network from the InP to
provide tailored services to their customers through allocation
of dedicated resources, iii) the Network Slice Broker (NSB),
which is in charge of mediating between tenants’ requirements
and network resource availability, and instructing the physical
infrastructure to accommodate requests.
In more detail, upon slice requests arrivals, the NSB is in
charge of running an admission control mechanism, and if
granted, deploying the new slices in the system. Such admis-
sion control mechanism involves the evaluation of the slice
resource requirements against the resource availability over
the different network domains, Radio Access Network (RAN),
transport, and core. Keeping running slices SLAs isolated from
newcomers is of paramount importance in this scenario as it
shall avoid resource shortage that might impact the service
delivery. As different tenants may require a diverse set of net-
work resources, the admissibility of each slice request depends
on an elaborated multi-domain optimization problem, see for
instance [4]. To ease this task, a common solution accounts
for the usage of a predefined set of Network Slice Templates
(NSTs) [5]. Each template specifies static parameters and
functional components of different network slice types as well
as the relevant attribute’s value in terms of resource allocation
requirements necessary to satisfy the service provisioning. An
illustration of the workflow is depicted in Fig. 1.
A. Related Work
Both network slicing and blockchain paradigms recently
attracted wide interest as a consequence of the hype around
5G mobile networks and cryptocurrencies. Therefore, perhaps
not surprisingly, several research efforts started investigating
how to combine these two emerging technologies.
In [6] the authors present a study on the leasing ledger
concept proposing the blockchain technology as a means to
overcome absence of trust in data management and satisfy the
need for automated solutions in industrial network facilities.
One of the key-features inherited by the blockchain technology
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Fig. 1: Network slice brokerage overview
is indeed the capability of providing trust in a distributed way.
The authors of [7] exploit this feature to minimize (discourage)
over-committing issues during the negotiation of SLAs and
radio frequency channels assignments between InP and Mobile
Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs). Differently from our
work, they only focus on RAN-specific resource negotiation
without considering other network domains. Recent related
work along our proposal has been presented by [8] in the
context of vehicular ad-hoc network communication. Despite
a complete analysis about security and performance aspects,
no guidance is provided regarding functions and/or consensus
protocols to achieve the complete solution. Finally, [9] pro-
poses to extend the NFV-MANO architecture to account for a
dedicated API through which network slices can be configured
and orchestrated according to the negotiated transactions. As
future work, [9] highlights the need for a consensus algorithm
able to manage, in an efficient manner, the huge number of
interactions expected in slicing systems.
The key novelty of our framework is the capability to
support the network slice resource brokerage process in an
end-to-end fashion, embracing the multi-domain nature of the
network slicing paradigm and its need to guarantee heteroge-
neous tenants’ requirements, even at fine-grained granularity.
Conversely, none of these prior works fully investigates a
multi-tenant multi-domain scenario, limiting their analysis at
domain-specific implementations.
III. THE HIERARCHICAL ARCHITECTURE TO EVOLVE THE
NETWORK SLICING MARKET
While the network slice market is envisioned to unlock a
wide set of business opportunities [10], the management of a
multitude of relatively small network slices—if geographically
constrained like small business industries and factories—
introduce additional complexity in the orchestration process
when performed in a centralized fashion: operators might not
want to undertake it.
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Fig. 2: A distributed hierarchical architecture for network slicing.
The network slice ecosystem is envisioned to support
dynamic and real-time resource allocation over the mobile
network. In such a fast-changing scenario, tenant requirements
may vary as a result of external causes, e.g., end-users’ mo-
bility, possibly leaving tenants with under or over-provisioned
network slices and the need of acquiring/releasing resources.
In this context, the roles of the InP and the wholesaler can
be comparable. From this perspective, it is preferable to deal
with the exchange of big quantities of goods to intermediate
retailers rather than trading, with a significant increase of
management costs, small quantities directly with the end-users.
Thus, this opens up to new marketing opportunities for 3rd-
party entities willing to play the role of retailers, e.g., Mobile
Virtual Network Operators, municipalities in case of public
events, highway operators and factories, which may buy a
quota of network resources from the InP and re-sell it to
final tenants. We define such business entities as Intermediate
Brokers (IBs). We envision the network slicing economy as an
open market where tenants can select the IB that best suits their
requirements, e.g., better price, thus leading to the creation of
consortia of tenants under the management of the same IB.
The proposed architecture is depicted in Fig. 2.
Technical challenges. In order to support the hierarchical
structure above-described as well as the additional manage-
ment and security complexity inherited by this enhanced busi-
ness model, several challenges must be considered: flexibility
and scalability are key-features for next generation mobile
networks.
Network slices should meet tailored and fast service pro-
visioning requirements as dictated by the service diversity
foreseen in the 5G era. Fully automated solutions are thus
necessary to keep efficient network operations and manage-
ment while reducing costs. End-user mobility aspects and
interference management bring additional complexity in the
network slicing context, especially for real-time use-cases.
The assignment of network resources to tenants in such cases
Algorithm 1 Smart Contract implementing an auction-based
resource allocation scheme.
1: Input: AuctionEndTime, ResourceSet
2: Initialize: HighestBidderID = 0x00, HighestBid = 0
3: while Now() ≤ AuctionEndTime do
4: ListOfBids = CollectBids();
5: for CurrentBid ∈ ListOfBids do
6: if CurrentBid.value > HighestBid then
7: HighestBidderID = CurrentBid.peerID;
8: end if
9: end for
10: end while
11: Notify(HighestBidderID, ”Your Bid was the highest.”);
12: Assign(ResourceSet, HighestBidderID);
requires the resource allocation process to evolve dynamically
following tenant demand variations.
At the same time, the chain of network resource loans must
be negotiated in a secure, transparent and fast way [11], [12],
such that the lifecycle of each slice is not affected. Current
mobile network sharing solutions require long negotiation pro-
cesses that hardly fit within short time-to-market deployments
of the 5G use-cases.
Due to its decentralized nature, the blockchain technology
well suits these requirements. The distributed ledger allows all
members of the system to be aware of the current (and past)
network resource availability as well as to be informed, in
real-time, about the dynamic exchange of resources through a
public hash-chain of blocks provided with valid transactions.
A secure resource exchange is guaranteed by smart contracts
and distributed consensus algorithms, allowing the system to
evolve autonomously without the need of centralized authori-
ties.
A. Blockchain
Despite becoming famous for the hype around cryptocur-
rencies, the blockchain technology applicability is not limited
to that scope. In its simplest definition, a blockchain is a dis-
tributed data structure shared among the members of the net-
work. Each block stores information about a set of transactions
e.g., timestamp, amount of good exchanged, partners involved
and most importantly a reference to the previous block of the
chain (usually the hash of its content). The creation of new
blocks involves secure cryptographic mechanisms that make
the chain unalterable and safe against fraudulent attacks. The
content of a blockchain database is broadcast and updated in
a decentralized manner, being the absence of a centralized
control an advantage for data transparency.
However, the decentralized architecture implies synchro-
nization issues, for example, when dealing with the insertion
of new blocks in the chain. This calls for the introduction of
a consensus mechanism to keep the information contained in
the ledger coherent within the network. Several algorithms are
available in the literature showing advantages and drawbacks,
e.g., proof of elapsed time, proof of work, and so on [13].
We can identify two types of blockchain: i) Permissionless
chains allow anyone to read, to write and to participate in
the creation of the ledger, ii) Permissioned blockchains pose
restriction on who is allowed to participate in the network
Resource 
Advertisement/Request
Tenant Signature
Content
Timestamp
Tenant Public Key
Transaction Type
Message ID
Amount
Metadata
Tenant Signature
Content
Timestamp
Responder Public Key
Request Message ID
Response ID
Result
Metadata
Transaction Type
Transaction 
Response
Timestamp
Responder Public Key
Request Message ID
Response ID
Result
Metadata
Transaction Type
Timestamp
Tenant Public Key
Transaction Type
Message ID
Amount
Metadata
Fig. 3: Example of transaction message exchange within NSBchain.
activities, e.g., limiting the kind of transactions. Considering
the enterprise f lit represented by a mobile network infras-
tructure, permissioned access is preferable to maintain high
security levels. To this aim, permissioned blockchains often
exploit Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) to securely
onboard participants and assist with the establishment of
the consortium that composes the blockchain network. Such
scheme also avoids the need of energy consuming activities re-
lated to block validation process, which has been identified as
one of the main drawbacks of public blockchain systems [14].
Therefore, we can assume that peer nodes admitted in the
system are not malicious and rational, i.e., profit driven.
In the blockchain context, smart contracts are often used to
automatize the exchange of goods in reply to trigger events.
A smart contract can be defined as an agent that translates
contractual clauses into self-enforcing software that minimizes
the need of trusted intermediaries. SCs are stored in the
blockchain and provided with a unique address, making it
easy to be reached from all the peers in the network and
inheriting useful security features like distributed consensus
agreements to prevent fraudulent usages. The implementation
of smart contracts often implies the usage of high-level pro-
gramming languages, which are then compiled into low-level
byte-coded languages and loaded into the blockchain to ensure
immutability.
In our framework, we exploit SCs to guarantee reliable
auditing and enforce IB-specific policies in the management
of requests. For example, one IB may decide to auction his
share of resources in different ways [15], [16] or simply sell
them to the first coming tenant. The pseudocode of an auction-
based SC implementation is shown in Algorithm 1. Peer nodes
can invoke a SC by sending transactions to its address. In
more detail, if a new transaction is proposed in the system,
the contract address can be inserted as recipient address of
the transaction. To validate the resource exchange, all the peer
entities execute the code using, among the others, transaction
payloads and current system state as input arguments of
the call [17]. The participation in the consensus protocol
finally assures that the new output ledger comes from valid
transactions.
IV. THE NSBCHAIN FRAMEWORK
Hereafter, we introduce our novel framework, namely NS-
Bchain, showing the main advantages and limitations when
implemented in real deployments.
A. Smart Contracts
Analytically, let us introduce B = {b1, bk, . . . , bK} as the
set of IBs allowed to trade network resources, and Tk =
{τ1, τt, . . . , τT } as the set of tenants admitted within the
consortium of IB bk. Being a permission-based system, our
framework requires an invitation for participation1. To guar-
antee secure message exchange, each entity is provided with
a cryptographic key pair {Kpriv,Kpub}. The usage of group
signature schemes and the generation of new key pair for every
message exchange is preferable to avoid reply attacks [18].
We detail in the following the main steps involved in the
creation and management network slices on a blockchain-
based platform providing a mathematical background for the
consensus process and the overall revenue maximization.
System Setup. In order to enable dynamic resource ex-
change among tenants, a dedicated blockchain must be set
up for each consortium of tenants. Each IB bk deploys the
first block of the chain and loads a registry of resources
Rk = {r1, ri, . . . , rI} into such a block, which reflects the
amount of i-type resources, with i ∈ I, originally assigned
by the InP. This step is required to avoid over-selling so as
to limit the availability of resources in the blockchain. Each
IB bk can define leasing policies and code them into a set of
SCs, which are then available to all tenants in the consortium.
Finally, each IB bk is in charge of assigning the initial share
of resources to admitted tenants.
Message Exchange. Upon private exchange domain cre-
ation, network slice requests can be dispatched among the
network of peers. According to their real-time requirements,
tenants may decide to publish a resource advertisement or a re-
source request message. In the former case, the current owner
of resources decides to release some of his shares making
them available on the market. In the latter case, the tenant
broadcasts its need to other tenants, which may be interested
in providing their quota. To guarantee authentication, each
message is signed with the sender private key and uniquely
identified by an ID number. A simplified message structure is
depicted in Fig. 3.
The network slicing brokerage must deal with multi-domain
resource allocation problems. In its simplest definition, a
resource request from tenant τ can be defined as a tuple Ψτ =
[pi
(τ)
1 , pi
(τ)
i , . . . , pi
(τ)
I |θ(τ)1 , . . . , θ(τ)I ], where pi(τ)i represents the
required amount of i-type resources, and θ(τ)i is the price to be
paid. It should be noticed that we do not pose any limitation
on the nature of exchanged resources, and that the proposed
resource request scheme easily accommodates heterogeneous
resource specifications. For example, a tenant could be more
interested in trading only Radio Access Network (RAN)
resources at the edge of the network, e.g., for delay sensitive
applications, while others may be more interested in cloud
resources, e.g., storage and processing power for data analytic
applications in the context of the Internet of Things (IoT).
1While the admission procedure is out of the scope of this paper, it is
assumed that such a mechanism is in place and managed by the InP to
guarantee that only trustworthy entities are admitted.
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Fig. 4: Private blockchain architecture supporting network slicing.
Billing Management. Interestingly, a blockchain can be
viewed as a transaction-based state machine, wherein its state
is updated every time consensus is reached on a set of
transactions. To this aim, orderer nodes can be introduced and
exploited to collect and sort proposed transactions by arrival
time. Such nodes are usually not involved in the validation
process, however they may allow decoupling and parallel
processing of ordering and validation functionalities thereby
improving the overall system efficiency [9].
We show the blockchain architecture with involved players
supporting network slicing in Fig. 4. Specifically, the IB may
join blockchain activities, i.e., it might read the blockchain
results, participate to validation and consensus phases as an
active member of the blockchain consortium. This implies
that the IB can recursively apply confirmed (validated) trans-
actions onto resource scheduling policies that might include
(not limited to) RAN/transport and computational resources.
Despite enabling a more dynamic resource trading market,
the blockchain technology would easily allow to keep track
of the different resource exchange over time. From the InP
perspective, this also simplifies the billing management as
each block of transactions stores precise information about the
nature of the exchanged resources and the corresponding time
window utilization. Moreover, tenants are directly responsible
for the management of their requests: once issued, they could
not be withdrawn. Clearly, each IB shows interest in managing
properly its resource share with the objective of maximizing
the overall final revenue while parsing and processing upcom-
ing slice requests. Let us assume that each tenant τ can issue
multiple slice requests so that the IB can collect all coming
slice requests Ψj with j ∈ J . Let us denote xi,j as a decision
variable indicating whether i-resources of request j is assigned
(to the tenant issuing such a request) whereas yj is used to
prevent from partially assigning resources to a single slice
request: in other words, a slice request is accommodated only
if all types of demanded resources can be assigned to the tenant
thereby guaranteeing a correct end-to-end slice instantiation.
We can formally write the following optimization problem:
Problem IB-REVENUE-MAX:
maximize
∑
j
µjyj
subject to
∑
j
pi
(j)
i xi,j ≤ ri, ∀i ∈ I;∑
i
xi,j ≥ Iyj , ∀j ∈ J ;∑
i
xi,j ≤ Iyj , ∀j ∈ J ;
xi,j ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ I,∀j ∈ J ;
yj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ J .
where µj =
∑
i θ
(j)
i ,∀j ∈ J represents the overall revenue
from all types of resources included within the slice request
j, and I represents the resource set with I = |I|. The above
optimization problem can be easily mapped onto a integer-
linear programming (ILP) problem and solved by means of
commercial solvers, e.g. [19].
Consensus algorithm. The ownership of a resource set
can be transferred from one tenant to another by invoking
a transaction on the blockchain. The transaction is validated
only if all the relevant parties agree, namely, a consensus
among peer nodes is reached. When dealing with consensus
algorithms, a trade-off between transaction throughput and
latency must be considered. We define transaction throughput
as the number of transactions that the system can handle per
unit of time. In realistic scenarios, this number can range over
a wide range depending on the study use-case. For example,
public BitCoin’s network supports 7 transactions per second,
while the financial networks of MasterCard and Visa handle up
to 60000 [20]. Obviously, different consensus algorithms pro-
vide different latency. For this reason, we let each IB bk choose
the preferred method according to its service requirements.
In general, being NSBchain a permissioned framework, we
suggest the use of relatively light mechanisms, like Practical
Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) consensus protocol [21],
Kafka [22] or Raft [23] to allow fast convergence to a common
agreement and speed up the resource exchange process.
V. PROOF-OF-CONCEPT EVALUATION
We implement NSBchain on top of Hyperledger Fab-
ric [24], an open-source framework for developing permis-
sioned blockchains within private enterprises, and make use of
its benchmarking tool, namely Hyperledger Caliper, to evalu-
ate the blockchain performance in network slicing scenarios.
Experimental setup. Our Proof-of-Concept (PoC) architec-
ture consists of 3 IBs and a variable number of orderer nodes
that depends on the adopted consensus algorithm. Such entities
run as Docker containers on an Intel Xeon CPU E5-2630v3
32-Core @2.4GHz 64GB RAM shared platform.
We guarantee the isolation among consortia through the
definition of dedicated and encrypted communication chan-
nels. Moreover, we set the maximum number of entries per
block to 20 and the block timeout2 to 300 ms. This last
2We select such values as they maximize the throughput at a minimum
latency cost as proved hereafter in the section.
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Fig. 5: Performance evaluation for different consensus algorithms and consortium size a) Slice request throughput and Blockchain size
growth b) Validation latency.
metric specifies the amount of time (after receiving the first
transaction) each orderer waits before publishing a new set
of proposed transactions to other peer nodes. Please note
that the choice of those parameters may strongly affect the
blockchain performance. In particular, although decreasing the
block timeout improves the latency, setting it to low values
may decrease the overall throughput as new blocks would not
be filled up to their maximum capacity. To limit the impact of
this trade-off on our results, we do not modify these settings
throughout this section.
The benchmark process consists of two phases, dubbed as
opening and transfer. In the initial phase, we create tenant
instances and assign them with an equal amount of resources
such that all available resources at IB side are assigned.
Once assigned, each tenant might decide to free or seek
additional resources based on a random value drawn from
a uniform distribution between 0 and 30% of the initially
assigned amount3. During the transfer phase, tenants issue
Slice Requests (SRs), modeled as tuples Ψτ = {ρ, η, γ},
where ρ, η, γ ∈ Rk represent the percentage of required radio
access, transport and core cloud resources, respectively. In
case the SR does not fit the availability or the need of the
involved tenants (SR collision), it is automatically rejected and
the respective transaction is dropped.
Full-scale evaluation. With the first experiment we evaluate
the performance of our framework in terms of slice request
throughput and latency. We compare two popular consensus
algorithms (Kafka and Raft) against a single orderer configu-
ration (Solo) that does not require any consensus process. The
top of Fig. 5a shows the average SR throughput of the platform
in the transfer phase for an increasing consortium size and
fixed SR rate of 150 SRs/s to emulate high load conditions.
In these settings, especially for a small consortium size, the
limiting factor of the blockchain performance throughput is
3We empirically prove that the choice of this value leads to convergence
within a reasonable time.
the Multiversion Concurrency Control (MVCC) process. As
we issue SRs at a very high rate, the same database entry,
e.g. the resources assigned to a specific tenant, may be edited
by a new request before the completion of the validation
process involving it. This raises a database inconsistency,
dubbed as Read/Write (RW) conflict, which prevents the
current transaction to be successful. As shown in the figure,
this problem is mitigated by an increasing consortium size.
Fig. 5b depicts the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF)
of the experienced latency by the successful SRs. As expected,
the best latency performance is obtained when no distributed
consensus mechanism is in place, i.e., Solo. However, despite
being the fastest scheme, this single-node approach is not
fault tolerant. It can be noticed that the transaction exchange
and validation process introduce a small time overhead for
the Kafka and Raft cases, which however has negligible
impact, especially when compared to the onboarding time
required e.g., by virtualized infrastructures to setup virtual
services [12]. The blockchain growth rate is also affected by
the different consensus scheme, as shown at the bottom of
Fig. 5a, which refers to the consortium size case of 1000
tenants. We plot the evolution of the chain size over time
and mark the beginning of the transfer phase with a dashed
vertical line. It can be noticed that the blockchain grows at a
rate proportional to the average throughput since blocks are
filled up to their maximum capacity.
Brokering scenario evaluation. The second experiment
focuses on evaluating the capabilities of the system when
dealing with the brokering scenario. To this aim, we consider 3
IBs managing a consortium of 1000 tenants, correspondingly.
In light of the performances shown above, we select Kafka
as consensus algorithm for its high fault-tolerance and scala-
bility [25]. We assume that resource request values ρ, η, γ are
drawn from a right-skewed distribution over a positive interval
as resource requests must be non-negative. Such distributions
are depicted at the top of Fig. 6 for different demand ranges,
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spanning from 0.1% to 4% of the tenant initial resources. Note
that since we assume the same distribution for all resource
requests within the same slice, it is dubbed as SR PDF.
The bottom of Fig. 6 illustrates the system behavior for
a constant submission rate of 50 SRs/s so as to keep RW
Conflicts to a minimum (around 2% of the submitted SRs).
In such operational conditions, errors raise only in case of SR
collisions. It is worth noting that SR collision rate increases
along with the SR variance. Specifically, SR distributions
with high variance leads to tenant satisfaction more quickly
than with a lower variance. Additionally, the closer to tenant
satisfaction, the lower the resource availability and, in turn,
the smaller the likelihood of a request to be accepted by the
system.
VI. CONCLUSION
Network slicing has been identified as a key enabler for
the development of novel business models in 5G and beyond
mobile networks. In this paper we introduced a hierarchi-
cal blockchain-based framework, NSBchain, that provides a
brokering solution between the infrastructure provider and
network tenants willing to pay for acquiring, exchanging
and managing network and computational slice resources
within the domain of an intermediate broker. We developed
a Proof-of-Concept implementation leveraging on the open-
source Hyperledger platform and showed that our approach
is feasible and scalable (up to 1000 tenants were considered)
with different state-of-the-art consensus algorithms.
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